Thompson Sampling for Pursuit-Evasion Problems

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Abstract

Pursuit-evasion is a multi-agent sequential decision problem wherein a group of agents known as pursuers coordinate their traversal of a spatial domain to locate an agent trying to evade them. Pursuit evasion problems arise in a number of import application domains including defense and route planning. Learning to optimally coordinate pursuer behaviors so as to minimize time to capture of the evader is challenging because of a large action space and sparse noisy state information; consequently, previous approaches have relied primarily on heuristics. We propose a variant of Thompson Sampling for pursuit-evasion that allows for the application of existing model-based planning algorithms. This approach is general in that it allows for an arbitrary number of pursuers, a general spatial domain, and the integration of auxiliary information provided by informants. In a suite of simulation experiments, Thompson Sampling for pursuit evasion significantly reduces time-to-capture relative to competing algorithms.

1 Introduction

The general setup for pursuit evasion problems wherein multiple agents coordinate their efforts to locate a shrewd adversary is a useful model for important real-world decision problems arising in security, law enforcement, and wildlife management (Nahin 2012), (Fang, Stone, and Tambe 2015). Indeed, our interest in this problem is motivated by our involvement with the adaptive search for nuclear materials in collaboration with the consortium for non-proliferation enabling capabilities (CNEC).

There is an extensive literature on pursuit-evasion problems both from a theoretical and computational aspect (see (Rodin 1987), (Yavin and Pachter 2014) for an extensive list of references). Most closely related to the problem we consider is the partially observable Markov pursuit game studied by Hespanha et al. (2000). Heuristic search strategies in this domain are based on approximations of the belief state of the evader's location

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given current information; e.g., the local-max heuristic uses a one-step greedy optimization of the probability of capture in the next time step whereas the global-max heuristic moves pursuers toward the posterior mode o the evader's location (Hespanha, Prandini, and Sastry 2000), (Vidal et al. 2002). Kwak & Kim (2014) used a weighted combination of local- and global-max with the weights tuned using reinforcement learning.

We present a variant of Thompson Sampling for pursuit-evasion that comprises the following steps at each time point: (i) computing a posterior distribution over the space of possible evader strategies; (ii) truncating the tails from this posterior and then sampling a strategy from the resultant truncated distribution; and (iii) using model-based planning to estimate the optimal pursuer strategy. The truncation in (ii) can be seen as a mechanism to limit exploration to make the method 'safe,' i.e., to avoid potentially catastrophic action selection (Garcia and Fernández 2015). The proposed algorithm performs favorably relative to competitors in terms of time-to-capture in a suite of simulation experiments including pursuit-evasion over a grid and the coordination of ghost behavior in the class arcade game Pac-Man.

2 Setup and Notation

We consider a pursuit-evasion problem evolving in discrete time over a spatial domain represented (or approximated) by a fixed network. We consider a team of K pursuers coordinating their movements across the network to locate a single evader that is moving to avoid the pursuers and reach a goal node in the network. The initial location of the evader and goal node are unnecessarily known to the pursuers in our formulation. If the pursuers intercept the evader before the evader reaches a goal node, they receive a positive reward signal which may depend on time to capture or other attributes of their search path, e.g., paths taken etc. At each time point, the pursuers inspect nearby nodes (they have a limited radius of vision) for the evader and may also receive information about the evader's location from

benevolent informant; this latter feature is designed to reflect intelligence in a defense application.

Let $\mathcal{L}=\{1,\ldots,L\}$ be the set of nodes in the network and let $\Omega\in\{0,1\}^{L\times L}$ be its adjacency matrix, i.e., $\Omega_{\ell,\ell'}=1$ if locations ℓ and ℓ' are connected (ℓ is also connected to itself). At each time point $t \in \mathcal{T} = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots\}$, each agent selects a node from among the neighbors of their current location to which to move; a node is defined as its own neighbor to allow an agent to remain in the same location for multiple time steps. Let $E_t \in \mathcal{L}$ denote the location of the evader at time t and $G \subset \mathcal{L}$ the set of the evader's goal locations. Thus, if $E_t \in G$ before the evader is captured the game ends and the evader is declared the winner. Let $W_t = \left(W_t^1, \dots, W_t^K\right) \in \mathcal{L}^K$ denote the locations of the K pursuers at time t. Let $d(\ell, \ell)$ denote the graph distance between nodes ℓ and ℓ' . If the event $\min_k d(W_k^t, E_t) \leq 1$ occurs before the event $E_t \in G$ then the evader is said to be caught, the game ends, and the pursuers are declared the winners. Define C_t to be an indicator that the game has not ended at time t; thus, the duration of the game is $T = \min\{t : C_t = 1\}$. Let Y_t denote a momentary reward for the pursuers, e.g., a small negative constant while the game is ongoing and a large negative constant if the evader reaches its goal. In addition, at each time t, the pursuers may receive information from an informant in the form of a region $D_t \subseteq$ \mathcal{L} known to contain the evader at time t; for simplicity, we assume that informant information is completely reliable though this can be relaxed. For notational convenience, when no informant information is provided we code $D_t \equiv \mathcal{L}$. Also, we denote R_t as the event that the pursuers obtain the informant region D_t at time t. The information available to the pursuers at time t is therefore $H_t = \{R_0, W_0, C_0, Y_0, \dots, Y_{t-1}, R_t, W_t, C_t\}.$ Let $S_t = \{H_t, E_0, \dots, E_t\}$ denote the complete state of the system at time t.

At each time point, the pursuers and evader select a neighboring node to move to; however, the proposed methodology can be extended to a richer set of actions, e.g., in the context of tracking nuclear material, the set of actions might include planting a remote sensor. Let $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{L}}$ denote the set of distributions over \mathcal{L} . A strategy, π_E , is an infinite sequence of functions $\pi_{E,t}: \operatorname{dom} S_t \to \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{L}}$ such that $\pi_{E,t}(S_t)$ has support only on the neighbors of E_t . Let Π_E denote the set of allowable evader strategies. Similarly, let $\mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{L}^K}$ denote the space of distributions over \mathcal{L}^K and define a strategy, π_W , for the pursuers to be a sequence of maps $\pi_{W,t}: \operatorname{dom} H_t \to \mathcal{B}_{\mathcal{L}^K}$ such that $\pi_{W,t}(H_t)$ has support only on the neighbors of W_t . Let Π_W denote the set of allowable pursuer strategies. In some applications, the evader may only have access to a coarse summary of S_t , as we shall see, such constraints can be imposed through the class of candidates strategies considered for the evader.

For each $\pi_E \in \Pi_E$ and $\pi_W \in \Pi_W$, we define $V(\pi_E,\pi_W) = \mathbb{E}^{\pi_E,\pi_W} \left(\sum_{t=0}^T \gamma^{t-1} Y_t \right)$, where \mathbb{E}^{π_E,π_W} denotes expectation with respect to the distribution induced by the strategies (π_E,π_W) and $\gamma \in (0,1]$ is a discount factor. Given a strategy for the evader, $\pi_E \in \Pi_E$, an optimal pursuer strategy $\pi_W^* \in \Pi_W$ satisfies $V(\pi_E,\pi_W^*) \geq V(\pi_E,\pi_W)$ for all $\pi_W \in \Pi_W$.

3 Estimating the Evader's Strategy

If the evader's strategy is known, the pursuers can use standard methods from reinforcement learning to construct an estimator of π_W^* (Sutton and Barto 1998)(Powell 2007) (Si et al. 2004) (Busoniu et al. 2010) (Szepesvári 2010). Unfortunately, in practice the evader's strategy is not generally known. One approach is to approximate a Nash-equilibrium (Littman 1994)(Hu and Wellman 2003)(Wang and Sandholm 2003). However, while such game-theoretic solution concepts are appealing in some contexts, such equilibria need not be unique and furthermore fail to exploit non-equilibria behavior (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi 2005); this latter point is particularly relevant in pursuitevasion problems arising in defense and security applications in which evaders are likely following predefined strategies, employing heuristics, or acting erratically. We instead propose to model the evader's strategy using accumulating data and then to apply a variant of Thompson Sampling wherein, at each time t, an evader's strategy along with any other requisite system dynamics are sampled from a posterior given H_t and then these dynamics are used in model-based planning algorithm to estimate an optimal pursuer strategy (Gopalan and Mannor 2015).

Let Π_E be a pre-specified class of candidate policies for the evader and let $\rho(\pi_E)$ denote a prior distribution over this class. The class Π_E could be finite, finite-dimensional, or even infinite-dimensional though in most applications this class is heavily informed by domain expertise and finite-dimensional. At each time t, the posterior distribution $p(\pi_E|H_t)$ is used to quantify uncertainty about the evader's strategy given the history available to the pursuers; thus, π_E is treated as a parameter indexing the model whereas π_W is under control of the pursuers. Under mild regularity conditions, we provide closed-form expressions for $p(\pi_E|H_t)$ and the posterior distribution of the evader's location; these expressions are of interest in their own right as estimators of such probabilities are used in heuristic search strategies (Hespanha, Prandini, and Sastry 2000).

Let $\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_{\tau},\pi_E)$ be a $|\mathcal{L}|$ -dimensional vector where its rth component equals $P_{\pi_W}(E_t=r|H_{\tau},\pi_E)$, the probability the evader's location is r at time t given the history H_{τ} under policies π_E and π_W . $T_t(H_t,\pi_E)$ is the transition matrix for the evader's strategy π_E at

time t where $(T_t(H_t,\pi_E))_{\ell',\ell}=P(E_{t+1}=\ell'|E_t=\ell,H_t,\pi_E)$, which is given for \forall $\pi_E\in\Pi_E$; let F be the standardization operator on the $|\mathcal{L}|$ -dimensional positive orthant, i.e., $x\mapsto x/\sum_j x_j$. At each time t define

$$D_{t,\pi_E} = D_t \cap (\bigcup_{\ell \in W_t} \mathcal{A}_\ell)^c \cap G_{\pi_E}^c, \tag{1}$$

where G_{π_E} is the evader's goal set under strategy π_E . Let $I_{D_{t,\pi_E}}$ denote an $|\mathcal{L}| \times |\mathcal{L}|$ diagonal matrix such that the ℓ th diagonal element is 1 if $\ell \in D_{t,\pi_E}$ and 0 otherwise.

Assumption 3.1 For $D_t \subset \mathcal{L}$, $P_{\pi_W}(R_t|W_t, E_t = r, Y_{t-1}, H_{t-1}, \pi_E)$ is a constant for $\forall r \in D_t$ and $\forall \pi_E \in \Pi_E$.

Intuitively, this assumption states that the probability that the informant provides non-trivial information about the location of the evader does not depend on the evader's location or their strategy; this assumption can be relaxed to handle the setting where there are multiple informants more prone to report in different regions of the network.

Lemma 3.1 For $\forall \pi_E \in \Pi_E$ and $\forall \pi_W \in \Pi_W$,

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_{t-1},\pi_E) \\ = & T_t(H_{t-1},\pi_E) F(I_{D_{t-1},\pi_E} \mathbf{p}_{t-1,\pi_W}(H_{t-2},\pi_E)). \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, $\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_{t-1},\pi_E)$ is constant for $\forall \pi_W \in \Pi_W$.

Corollary 3.1 For $\forall \pi_E \in \Pi_E$ and $\forall \pi_W \in \Pi_W$,

$$\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_t,\pi_E) = F(I_{D_{t,\pi_B}} \mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_{t-1},\pi_E)).$$

Moreover, $\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_t,\pi_E)$ is constant for $\forall \pi_W \in \Pi_W$.

Through the recursion in the preceding lemma, one can derive $\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_{t-1},\pi_E)$ from the probability vector of the evader's initial location, \mathbf{p}_0 .

Theorem 3.1 Let π_E have prior $\rho(\pi_E)$, then $\forall \pi_W \in \Pi_W$,

$$p_{\pi_W}(\pi_E|H_t) \propto \prod_{i=0}^t P_{\pi_W}(E_i \in D_{i,\pi_E}|H_{i-1},\pi_E)\rho(\pi_E).$$

Note that $P_{\pi_W}(E_i \in D_{i,\pi_E}|H_{i-1},\pi_E)$ can be derived from $\mathbf{p}_{i,\pi_W}(H_{i-1},\pi_E)$ from which $p_{\pi_W}(\pi_E|H_t)$ can be obtained. We can see that $\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_{t-1},\pi_E)$, $\mathbf{p}_{t,\pi_W}(H_t,\pi_E)$ and $p_{\pi_W}(\pi_E|H_t)$ do not depend on π_W , so we suppress π_W in the notation for simplicity. Moreover, it means no matter which search strategy the pursuers follow, we can use the preceding relationships to derive the posterior of the evader's location and strategy at each time t.

4 Estimating the Optimal Search Strategy

Suppose that the optimal search strategy for the pursuers, say π_W^* , were known, the optimal action for the pursuers at time t would thus be

$$\underset{a}{\operatorname{argmax}} \ \mathbb{E}^{\pi_W^*, \pi_E} \left[\sum_{v \ge 0} \gamma^v Y_{t+v} \middle| H_t, A_t = a \right], \quad (2)$$

where A_t is the pursuers' action at time t. Furthermore, it can be seen that the expectation in (2) is equal to

$$\sum_{r \in \mathcal{L}} \mathbb{E}^{\pi_W^*, \pi_E} \left[\sum_{v \ge 0} \gamma^v Y_{t+v} \middle| E_t = r, H_t, A_t = a \right]$$

$$\times P_{\pi_W^*} (E_t = r | H_t, A_t = a, \pi_E).$$

 $\langle P_{\pi_W^*}(E_t = r | H_t, A_t = a, \pi_E).$

Under strategies π_E and π_W^* , $P_{\pi_W^*}(E_t = r | H_t, A_t = a)$ equals $\{\mathbf{p}_t(H_t, \pi_E)\}_r$ which is obtained in the previous section since the action $A_t = a$ is chosen deterministically. Thus, we only need to compute the Q-function

$$Q_{t}^{\pi_{W}^{*},\pi_{E}}(r,H_{t},a)$$

$$=\mathbb{E}^{\pi_{W}^{*},\pi_{E}}\left[\sum_{v\geq0}\gamma^{v}Y_{t+v}\middle|E_{t}=r,H_{t},A_{t}=a\right]$$

$$=\mathbb{E}^{\pi_{W}^{*},\pi_{E}}\left[\sum_{v=0}^{n-1}\gamma^{v}Y_{t+v}+\sum_{v\geq n}\gamma^{v}Y_{t+v}\middle|E_{t}=r,H_{t},A_{t}=a\right].$$

$$(4)$$

$$E_{t}=r,H_{t},A_{t}=a$$

Evaluating the Q-function is computationally burdensome and grows exponentially in the number of time points. Truncating the evaluation at n points can make the computation manageable. However, this will result in a loss of precision. An alternative is to evaluate the Q-function using an n-point expansion and for all further points approximate using a heuristic strategy. The expensive part of the evaluation is calculating the max at each point because it requires recursive enumeration of all possible paths. However, with a heuristic strategy, we only need to enumerate all possible paths for n steps and follow the heuristic strategy for the other steps, which can reduce the computational burden to a great extent. Thus, we approximate (4) by

$$\widehat{Q}_{t}^{\pi_{W}^{*},\pi_{E}}(r,H_{t},a)
= \mathbb{E}^{\pi_{W}^{*},n,\pi,\pi_{E}} \left[\sum_{v=0}^{n-1} \gamma^{v} Y_{t+v} + \gamma^{n} \sum_{v \geq 0} \gamma^{v} Y_{t+n+v} \right]
E_{t} = r, H_{t}, A_{t} = a,$$
(5)

where $\mathbb{E}^{\pi_W^*, n, \pi, \pi_E}$ is the expectation if pursuers follows the optimal strategy π_W^* before time t+n and a heuristic strategy π after that.

If n = 1, (5) is one-step look-ahead and the method to obtain the optimal action is known as the rollout algorithm with the rollout policy π (Sutton and Barto 1998). If n > 2, we can apply the heuristic search method to compute (5) when additional assumptions are made. If $\gamma^n \sum_{v>0} \gamma^v Y_{t+n+v}$ is $o_p(1)$, then the approximation error can be made arbitrarily small by increasing n. Thus the choice of the heuristic strategy has little impact for large n.

To approximate the optimal strategy, we use a heuristic strategy that moves pursuers in the direction of the locations with the largest posterior coverage. Let π_H be the heuristic strategy and π_E be the evader's strategy. This heuristic strategy is defined as

$$\pi_H(H_t) = \underset{\substack{a_1, \dots, a_K \\ a_i \in \mathcal{A}_{w_i}}}{\arg \min} \sum_{i=1}^K \operatorname{dist}(a_i, q_i(H_t))$$

where $\mathbf{q}(H_t) = (q_1(H_t), \dots, q_K(H_t))$ are the positions of the posterior with largest cumulative coverage at the next time step. The *i*th location, $q_i(H_t)$, is assigned to pursuer i by minimizing the cumulative distance between each pursuer and their assigned target location. These positions are defined as

$$\mathbf{q}(H_t) = \mathop{\arg\max}_{\substack{\{\ell_1, \dots, \ell_K\} \subset \mathcal{L} \\ \ell_k \neq \ell_{k'}}} \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^K \mathrm{dist}(w_j, \ell_j)^{-1} \right.$$

$$\mathbb{1}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{K} (\mathbf{p}_{t+1,\pi_E})_{\ell_j} = \max_{\substack{\{\widetilde{\ell}_1,\dots,\widetilde{\ell}_K\} \subset \mathcal{L} \\ \widetilde{\ell}_k \neq \widetilde{\ell}_{t,\prime}}} \sum_{j=1}^{K} (\mathbf{p}_{t+1}(H_t,\pi_E))_{\widetilde{\ell}_j}\right]$$

Since the game model is complex and computing the joint probability of all events is not generally feasible; instead, we apply a simulation-based method to approximate (5). To compute (5) requires that the pursuers follow the optimal strategy π_W^* from the beginning of the game to simulate a process which has the history H_t and $E_t = r$ at time t. This is not generally possible as π_W^* is unknown and the probability of the event $\{E_t = r, H_t\}$ occurring is typically vanishingly small when t is large. To solve this problem, we assume the evader's location E_t and the pursuers' history H_t provide a sufficient summary of the overall history S_t so that the evader's strategy π_E is determined only by E_t

Assumption 4.1 $(Y_t, E_{t+1}, R_{t+1}, W_{t+1}, C_{t+1}, ...)$ given S_t depends on S_t only through (E_t, H_t) , for $t \in \mathcal{T}$.

Assumption 4.2 *For* $t \in \mathcal{T}$,

$$\pi_{E,t}(S_t) = \pi_{E,t}(E_t, H_t).$$

Assumption 4.1 is weaker than the Markov assumption as it does not consider the influence of the pursuers' history H_t on the future. Assumption 4.2 guarantees that the pursuers can simulate the evader's action at time tgiven only $E_t = r$ and H_t . Moreover, the transition matrix $(T_t(H_t, \pi_E))_{\ell',\ell} = P(E_{t+1} = \ell' | E_t = \ell, H_t, \pi_E)$ is determined by π_E . These two assumptions hold in some common cases and we will discuss them further in Section 5. With these two assumptions, the pursuers can conduct simulation starting from time t given $E_t = r$ and H_t instead of from the beginning of the game. Moreover, (5) becomes

$$\widehat{Q}_{t}^{\pi_{W}^{*},\pi_{E}}(r,H_{t},a) = \mathbb{E}^{\pi_{W}^{*},\pi_{E}} \left[\sum_{v=0}^{n-1} \gamma^{v} Y_{t+v} + \gamma^{n} Q_{t+n}^{\pi,\pi_{E}}(E_{t+n},H_{t+n},\pi(H_{t+n})) \middle| E_{t} = r, H_{t}, A_{t} = a \right].$$
(6)

Then we can apply the heuristic search method to compute (6) where the values of leaf nodes are $Q_{t+n}^{\pi,\pi_E}(E_{t+n},H_{t+n},\pi(H_{t+n}))$ and they are backed up to the current state $(E_t = r, H_t)$ at the root. More details can be found in (Sutton and Barto 1998). In our experiment, we approximate (6) using a heuristic to reduce computation time. We consider all possible paths for pursuers from time t to t + n - 1 (taking action a at t) and then let pursuers follow the heuristic strategy π . We run s independent simulations for each path and obtain the average values of $\sum_{v\geq 0} \gamma^v Y_{t+v}$ for each path. The path with the largest average values implements $\mathbb{1}\left[\sum_{j=1}^K (\mathbf{p}_{t+1,\pi_E})_{\ell_j} = \max_{\substack{\{\widetilde{\ell}_1,\dots,\widetilde{\ell}_K\}\subset\mathcal{L}\\\widetilde{\ell}_1,\mathcal{L}\widetilde{\ell}}} \sum_{j=1}^K (\mathbf{p}_{t+1}(H_t,\pi_E))_{\widetilde{\ell}_j}\right]\right\}^{\text{the optimal strategy approximately and the largest average values is an approximation for (6). Note that when <math>n=1$, the method is actually the rollout algorithm. After we compute (6), the optimal action at time t can be obtained by (2) and (3).

The discussion above is to estimate the optimal strategy for the pursuers when the the evader's strategy is given. In practice, the the evader's strategy is not generally known but in Thompson Sampling, a candidate strategy for the evader can be sampled from a (possibly truncated) posterior over Π_E . The proposed algorithm, including the discussed heuristics, is given Algorithm 1. Note that in lines 7 and 15 in the algorithm, we can apply any other strategy, e.g., one estimated using reinforcement learning, the local-max strategy, or the global-max strategy. In the next section, we examine the empirical performance of Algorithm 1 through simulation of pursuit-evasion on a grid and a modification of the classic arcade game Pac-Man.

Numerical Results and Analysis Random-Walk-with-Drift Evader

In this case, the class of evader strategies which we consider is a random walk with drift towards the goal states. Each strategy in the class is indexed by two values: the evader's goal node, $G \in \mathcal{L}$, and the amount of drift, $\xi \in [0,1]$. With probability ξ , the evader takes the action that moves the evader closest to the goal state (with ties broken uniformly at random); otherwise, the evader takes a random action with uniform probability. For simplicity, we assume that the pursuers have prior belief in a finite number of possible goals $PG \subset \mathcal{L}$ and possible drifts $PD \subset [0,1]$. Thus Π_E is a finite set $\{\pi_1,...,\pi_B\}$. However, the true goal (TG) and the true drift (TD) of the evader may or may not belong to PG and PD respectively.

The network is an $m \times m$ grid. The pursuers and evader start in the opposite corners of the grid and pursuers know the evader's initial location D_0 . Figure 1 shows the starting positions of all units and the evader's goal locations when m = 10, K = 3. The informant region D_t is governed by both the pursuers' vision with radius v and information occasionally provided by an informant. Whether information is obtained from the informant at time t is determined by the random variable $O_t = \mathbb{1}_{\sum_{v=1}^t X_v > t}$ where $X_v \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \exp(\lambda)$, $\lambda = 0.3$ in our experiment. If $O_t = 1$, the pursuers learn the evader's location — i.e., each of the locations in the quadrant where the evader is currently located is appended to the informant region. If $O_t = 0$, no information is obtained from the informant at time t. For this episodic task, define T to be the (random) time point at which the game ends (that is, at which either the evader is caught or reaches the goal) and set the discount factor $\gamma=1.$ As for the outcome, $Y_t = -1$ for $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 1$. If the evader is caught by the pursuers at $T, Y_t = -1$ and if the evader reaches goal node G at T, $Y_T = -100$. Thus in order to maximize cumulative reward, the pursuers must capture the evader as soon as possible and keep the evader from reaching his goal.

Finally, a brief remark on the reasonableness of assumptions (3.1), (4.1), (4.2). For Assumption (3.1), we have $P_{\pi_W}(R_t|W_t,E_t=r,Y_{t-1},H_{t-1},\pi_E)=1$ for $\forall \ r\in D_t$ and $\forall \ \pi_E\in \Pi_E$, no matter if O_t is 0 or 1 (the proof is simple and we omit it due to space). For Assumption (4.1), it is evident the future event after time t is independent of the overall history S_t given the pursuers' history H_t and the evader's location E_t . Moreover, the evader's strategy only depends on his current location so Assumption (4.2) holds.

As measures of performance, we consider the proportion of episodes in which the evader is captured (C_1) , the average time at which the pursuer is captured (T), and the proportion of episodes in which the evader was captured via the shortest possible path given the evader's trajectory (C_2) .

The number of pursuers K is set to be 2 and grid sizes m=10,20 are considered. For the following experiments, we specify a uniform prior over Π_E and set the vision radius v=2 and TD=0.75. If m=10, we

set TG=7 and if m=20, we set TG=14. We consider the 12 experiment settings shown in Table 2. Experiment A is a benchmark search strategy in which the pursuers know the exact location of the evader and select their actions to minimize the distance to the evader (with ties broken uniformly at random). In Experiment B, pursuers make decisions according to minimax Q-learning (Littman 1994) and know the exact location and the goal of the evader. Experiments 1-10 use our proposed method, with varying values of m, PG, PD, and n (and with d=0.9 in each case).

Figure 3 displays the proportion of times that the evader's strategy is sampled by Truncated Thompson sampling over the course of an episode (and demonstrates that this tends to increase to 1). Table 1 shows that the pursuers are more likely to capture the evader and capture times are shorter as the vision radius v increases. Performance in Experiments 1-10 is better on our measures of performance than in baseline Experiments A and B. Experiments 1 and 6 show the superior performance of the proposed reinforcement learning method given the true strategy for the evader. (Note that even the true optimal search strategy may not catch the evader through the shortest path due to the randomness of the evader's movement.) When multiple strategies are given prior probability but the class of possible strategies still contains the evader's strategy, performance degrades relative to Experiments 1 and 6 but it still superior to the baseline methods (Experiments 2-4 and 7-9). Finally, Experiments 5 and 10 show two cases in which reasonable performance is attained even when the evader's strategy is not in the class of possible strategies assumed by the pursuers.

Pac-Man

The game Pac-Man (Trueman) can be seen as a pursuitevasion problem. In the game, there are four ghosts and Pac-Man navigating a maze. The goal of the four ghosts is to catch Pac-Man, while Pac-Man's goal is to eat as many dots as possible without being captured by the ghosts. If Pac-Man eats one of the four lage power dots near the corners of the maze, the ghosts are temporarily slowed and vulnerable to being eaten by Pac-Man.

In order to further study our method, we implemented a JavaScript version of Pac-Man in which the ghosts (pursuers) could follow one of several pursuit strategies (Figure 2 displays a screenshot of the game). Π_E consists of three strategies we devised for Pac-Man. The first is a pure random walk. The second is defined such that when the distance between Pac-Man and one of the ghosts is less than some value δ , the Pac-Man will move in the opposite direction of the closest ghost; otherwise Pac-Man will move uniformly at random. The third is the same as the second except that when the distance between Pac-Man and one of the ghosts is at least δ , Pac-Man moves towards the closest Pac-Dot with prob-

ability ξ and moves randomly otherwise. Thus, we write $\Pi_E = \{\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3^\xi\}$, where $\xi \in [0,1]$ is fixed. Both Pac-Man and the ghosts know the location of

each dot and whether it has been eaten or not. Thus the pursuers' history H_t should include the dots' history (i.e., the location of each dot and whether it has been eaten at each time up until t). Moreover, the Pac-Man knows the ghosts' locations exactly, while the ghosts only have vision radius v. The informant region D_t for the ghosts is determined by their vision and the dots' history (as Pac-Man's exact location is made known to the ghosts when a dot is eaten). The outcome Y_t is defined similarly as that in Section 5.1 except there is not a goal location for Pac-Man. Under these simulation settings, assumptions (3.1), (4.1) and (4.2) still hold (the proof of this is simple and we omit it here). In the experiment, the ghosts' prior on Pac-Man's strategy is uniform on $\Pi_E = \{\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3^{0.8}\}$, whereas the true strategy followed by Pac-Man is $\pi_3^{1.0}$; thus the set of possible strategies considered by the pursuers does not include the true strategy.

As before, We compare our method with a search strategy in which the ghosts know Pac-Man's exact location and select their actions to minimize the distance to Pac-Man. Scores for Pac-Man and capture time (T) are shown in Table 3. The results show that our method performs slightly better than the benchmark strategy even if the ghosts give zero prior weight to Pac-Man's true strategy. However, the strategy considered is the true strategy for Pac-Man with some randomness and it explains why our method performs well. (In practice, including in Π_E strategies which include randomness may improve robustness, as this may account for e.g. accidental missteps by the evader.)

6 Discussion

We formalized the problem of pursuit and evasion and developed a general framework for rigorously constructing and testing estimators of the evader's strategy and the pursuers optimal search strategy. We demonstrated methods for estimating the evader's strategy and the optimal search strategy using a rollout-based approximation to the Q-function. The proposed estimators performed well across a variety of settings though in many settings greedy application of Thompson Sampling (i.e., using the posterior mode for π_E) performs well. Because the proposed framework is Bayesian, it can seemlessly incorporate prior knowledge which may be especially beneficial in defense applications where the behavior of the adversary has been studied extensively.

There are a number of interesting directions for future work. One direction is to add complexities to more closely mimick real-life search problems. The abilities of all search units could be expanded by providing new actions in addition to movement. For example, the pur-



Figure 1: Schematic for starting positions of all units and evader's goal locations when m=10, K=3. The red diamond is the starting evader's location $\{99\}$. The white squares are the starting locations of the pursuers $\{0,1,10\}$. Green crosses are the possible locations of the evader's goal $\{0,7,70\}$.



Figure 2: A screen shot for the game Pac-Man.

suers might have a "scan" action which forces them to remain still, but allows them to capture the evader if they are k edges away instead of just 1. Another example is a "dash" action which allows a pursuer to move at a faster rate, but the ability to detect the evader is less reliable. Another area of future research is prioritization of capture zones. In real world applications, capturing an evader could have negative side effects. For example, someone carrying nuclear materials might detonate on capture. Thus, it is important to try and capture the evader in an area that will minimize damage. Incorporating this prioritization into the pursuer search strategy could lead to interesting new methodologies.

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


Figure 3: The proportion of the true evader's strategy sampled by Truncated Thompson sampling with different truncating coefficients (d) under m = 10, n = 0, TG = 7, TD = 0.75. The left side is for the setting $PG = \{7,70\}, PD = \{0.25,0.75\}, v = 2$ while the right side is for $PG = \{7,70\}, PD = \{0.75\}, v = 0.$ 500 games are simulated for each setting.

Algorithm 1 Thompson sampling for the pursuitevasion problem.

- 1: From domain knowledge, the pursuers are given a class of strategies Π_E wherein lies the evader's strategy possibly. Also, each element $\pi_E \in \Pi_E$ has a prior $\rho(\pi_E)$.
- 2: Observe $H_0 = (R_0, W_0, C_0)$.
- 3: Initialize the prior probability vector of E_0 , $\mathbf{p}_0 \in$
- 4: Initialize $D_{0,\pi_E} = D_0 \cap (\bigcup_{l \in W_0} \mathcal{A}_l)^c \cap G_{\pi_E}^c$.
- 5: Initialize $K(H_0|\pi_E) = P(E_0 \in D_{0,\pi_E})$, for $\pi_E \in$ Π_E .
- 6: Sample $\tilde{\pi}_E \sim \rho(\pi_E)$.
- 7: Initialize \tilde{n} and $\mathbf{p}_0(H_0, \tilde{\pi}_E) = F(I_{D_{0,\tilde{\pi}_E}} \mathbf{p}_0)$. Obtain $r = \operatorname{argmax}_{r \in \mathcal{L}}(\mathbf{p}_0(H_0, \tilde{\pi}_E))_r$. Compute (6) with simulation for $\forall a$ and select $A_0 = a$ with the largest values in (6) as the optimal action for pursuers.
- 8: **for** iteration $t = 1, 2, \dots$ **do**
- Observe (R_t, W_t, C_t) .
- $\mathbf{p}_{t}(H_{t-1}, \pi_{E}) = T_{t}(H_{t-1}, \pi_{E})\mathbf{p}_{t-1}(H_{t-1}, \pi_{E})$
- for $\pi_E \in \Pi_E$. $D_{t,\pi_E} = D_t \cap (\bigcup_{l \in W_t} \mathcal{A}_l)^c \cap G_{\pi_E}^c$, for $\pi_E \in \Pi_E$. 11: 12:

 $K(H_t|\pi_E) = \sum_{r \in D_{t,\pi_E}} (\mathbf{p}_t(H_{t-1}, \pi_E))_r K(H_{t-1}|\pi_E),$

- $\begin{array}{l} \text{for } \pi_E \in \Pi_E. \\ p(\pi_E|H_t) = \frac{K(H_t|\pi_E)\rho(\pi_E)}{\int_{\pi_E' \in \pi_E} K(H_t|\pi_E')p(\pi_E')}, \ \text{for } \pi_E \in \end{array}$ 13:
- Sample $\tilde{\pi}_E \sim p(\pi_E|H_t)$. 14:
- $\mathbf{p}_t(H_t, \tilde{\pi}_E) = F(I_{D_{t,\tilde{\pi}_E}} \mathbf{p}_t(H_{t-1}, \tilde{\pi}_E))$ and $r = \operatorname{argmax}_{r \in \mathcal{L}}(\mathbf{p}_t(H_t, \tilde{\pi}_E))_r$. Compute (6) with simulation for $\forall a$ and select $A_t = a$ with the largest values in (6) as the optimal action for pursuers.
- 16: **end for**

\overline{v}	1	2
C_1	0.71	0.90
\overline{T}	11.76	10.84

Table 1: Performance of the pursuers with different vision radius when m = 10, $PG = \{7,70\}$, PD = $\{0.75\}, TG = 7, TD = 0.75 \text{ and } n = 1.100 \text{ games}$ are simulated.

Exp.	m	PG	PD	n
A	10	*	*	*
В	10	{7}	*	*
1	10	{7}	{.75}	2
2	10	$\{7,70\}$	$\{.25, .75\}$	0
3	10	$\{7,70\}$	$\{.25, .75\}$	1
4	10	$\{7,70\}$	$\{.25, .75\}$	2
5	10	$\{8,80\}$	$\{.2,.5\}$	2
6	20	{14}	$\{.75\}$	2
7	20	{14, 140}	$\{.25, .75\}$	0
8	20	{14, 140}	$\{.25, .75\}$	1
9	20	$\{14, 140\}$	$\{.25, .75\}$	2
10	20	{12, 120}	$\{.5, .9\}$	2
		, ,		
Exp.	C_1	T	C_2	
A		T 11.08 (0.17)		
	C_1	T	C_2	
A	C_1 .72	T 11.08 (0.17)	C ₂ * * .95	
A B	.72 .43	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26)	C ₂ * *	
$ \begin{array}{c} A \\ B \\ \hline 1 \\ \hline 2 \\ \hline 3 \end{array} $	C_1 .72 .43	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19) 10.71 (0.17)	C ₂ * * .95	
A B 1 2 3 4	C_1 .72 .43 1 .81	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19)	C ₂ * * .95 .57	
A B 1 2 3 4 5	C_1 .72 .43 1 .81 .89	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19) 10.71 (0.17) 10.66 (0.14) 10.73 (0.17)	C ₂ * * .95 .57 .78	
A B 1 2 3 4	C ₁ .72 .43 1 .81 .89 .95	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19) 10.71 (0.17) 10.66 (0.14)	C ₂ * * .95 .57 .78 .84	
A B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	C ₁ .72 .43 1 .81 .89 .95	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19) 10.71 (0.17) 10.66 (0.14) 10.73 (0.17) 21.60 (0.25) 24.30 (0.44)	* * .95 .57 .78 .84 .78 .88 .46	
A B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	C ₁ .72 .43 1 .81 .89 .95 .89	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19) 10.71 (0.17) 10.66 (0.14) 10.73 (0.17) 21.60 (0.25) 24.30 (0.44) 23.22 (0.38)	C_2 * * .95 .57 .78 .84 .78 .88 .46 .52	
A B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	C_1 .72 .43 1 .81 .89 .95 .89 1 .84	T 11.08 (0.17) 12.28 (0.26) 10.24 (0.11) 11.21 (0.19) 10.71 (0.17) 10.66 (0.14) 10.73 (0.17) 21.60 (0.25) 24.30 (0.44)	* * .95 .57 .78 .84 .78 .88 .46	

Table 2: A summary of the simulation results for different settings when the truncation coefficient is 0.9. Experiment A and B represent the benchmark and the minimax Q-learning strategies respectively. n=0 represents the heuristic strategy defined in Section 4. For each setting, 100 and 50 games are simulated for m =10 and m=20 respectively. Standard errors are shown in the brackets.

	T	Score
TTS	127 (8)	874 (57)
Benchmark	131 (10)	900 (59)

Table 3: The capture time and scores for the Truncated Thompson Sampling method (d = 0.9) and the benchmark method in the Pac-Man game. For each setting, 50 games are simulated. Standard errors are shown in the brackets.

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